I. Introduction
Standards of performance such as good faith and fiduciary duty make bargaining possible. Because standards of performance level the playing field, they enable the more vulnerable party to express its preferences and thus to bargain. The standards have this effect because they are both flexible and precise. Unfortunately, the standards of performance are under siege in the United States and in Europe. While some of the strongest criticism of the standards concerns their vagueness, their flexibility allows parties to negotiate meaningfully and thus to express their preferences. Consequently, far from being sources of distortion, the standards give a voice to those who otherwise would not be heard. To use a political analogy, the standards enable, in the commercial realm, the democratic voice championed by Amartya Sen.
[FN1] This is an affirmative reason to have standards of performance. *1002 Although there is general agreement that the standards are flexible, the claim that they are precise is counterintuitive. While there is general acceptance of a floor--that is, of a minimum standard--the common complaint about the standards' vagueness presupposes the lack of a clear ceiling. In fact, actual behavior supported by law reveals that the standards of performance have an identifiable floor and a self-executing ceiling. By confirming the existence of a floor and a ceiling, I show that the standards are precise within a prescribed range; indeed, further specification would merely destroy the flexibility. The flexibility of the standards provides the subtlety; their precision provides the predictability. Despite the current challenge to the standards, United States law still supports them, and because the standards' flexibility and precision make bargaining possible, business law should continue that support.
II. Standards of Performance Are Flexible and Designed to Level the Playing
Field Standards of performance are flexible and designed to level the playing field. They play a larger, more important role than merely to reduce agency costs, the role often used to justify good faith or fiduciary duty.
[FN2] Standards of performance often make the bargain possible.
A. Leveling the Playing Field Starting with an analogy to pollution, assume a downstream landowner who values clean water more than the upstream polluter values the right to pollute. Assume further that the downstream owner does not have the money to pay the upstream polluter to clean its effluents. In this context, the downstream owner is powerless. Regulation can level the playing field so that the downstream owner--before regulation, the weaker party--has the power to negotiate meaningfully. The downstream owner then can obtain the clean water that this owner values more than the polluter values the permission to pollute.
[FN3] Standards of performance similarly operate to level the playing field in the context of contracts and of business organizations. They do so by correcting for unequal power and for conflicts of interest. In order for the standards to level the field effectively, the greater the conflict and inequity of power, the higher must be the applicable standard. The four examples below, two from contract law and two from unincorporated business entity law, reflect this direct relationship between the standards of performance on the one hand, and power and conflict on the other. [FN4] *1003 Before beginning our discussion of contract law, note that contract law is relevant to unincorporated businesses in part because contracts play a significant role in the formation of organizations, and in part because of decades of "nexus of contract" analogies. [FN5] In an arm's length transaction governed by contract law--that is, on a level playing field--each party is assumed capable of self-defense. In that context, any behavior to a standard higher than opportunism conforms to contract law good faith and is appropriate.
[FN6] This result makes sense because neither party can overpower the other, even though their interests can conflict. The relative power equilibrium keeps abuse to a minimum. In effect, the level of good faith in an arm's length transaction is another way of describing conformity with the parties' expectations. At least in the United States, this means an objective perspective with a touch of the subjective: What would a reasonable person in the parties' position expect? Higher on the graph, the standard of performance reflects the obligations of a contracting party with significant control, for example, a party whose performance is the sole basis for calculating another party's return. Consider the percentage lessee, whose rent obligation depends on the lessee's own sales. Not only does the lessee have commercial power over the lessor because the lessor's return depends on the lessee's performance, but the lessee's interest clearly is in conflict with that of the lessor: If the lessee can maintain profits while pushing sales down, the lessee pays less rent and further increases profits. In the United States, that person will be held to a "best efforts" standard, both because the landlord is at the mercy of the tenant, and because the tenant has an inherent conflict. [FN7] Moving up the graph yet further, we find, for example, the non-managing partner in a general partnership. The other partners would expect some minimum level of honesty and concern for the firm's well-being, but we also know that each partner invests in a firm in order to make profits. Thus, while a partner traditionally has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the fellow partners, the partner expects (that word again) profits.
[FN8] Inherent in the ordinary partnership relation is some degree of self-interest. There is at the very least a potential conflict for a partner who does not have a role in management, but does have an acknowledged self-interest in acquiring profit. The risk *1004 could, for example, become manifest in an situation similar to theft of corporate opportunity: A partner, not involved in management, but still understood to be part of the firm, is informed of an opportunity because of that relationship. The partner, possessing the information, has the power to be a disloyal agent of the partnership and to steal the opportunity instead of taking only the aliquot share through the partnership. Such a disloyal agent breaches the fiduciary duty applicable to partners, a performance standard higher than best efforts. [FN9] Further up the graph we find the partnership's managing partner in whom the fellow partners are placing their faith. In the classic partnership, not only do the other partners depend on the managing partner's performance in order to maximize the value of their investment in the partnership, but they also rely on that managing partner to avoid activities that would create personal liability for all owners.
[FN10] Thus, the managing partner clearly has power; specifically, the power to determine the future of the firm as a whole. The managing partner in this way has the power to choose for the firm a transaction in which the managing partner already has a personal interest. This is in addition to the conflict of interest inherent in the managing partner's desire to make a profit through the partnership. In the United States, the managing partner is held to a standard even higher than best efforts, but without denying the managing partner's legitimate desire for a share of partnership profits. [FN11] The highest level on the graph for a business organization still is lower than the standard applied to a trustee because the trustee, not the beneficiary, has total control over the corpus, and the trustee's conflict is inherent in that power. The trustee can, as a factual matter, do anything with the corpus, often without the beneficiary being aware and, therefore, is expected to behave selflessly. Indeed, the trustee, contrary to even a *1005 managing partner, is expected to take actions detrimental to the trustee if the actions benefit the corpus for the beneficiary. [FN12] This schematic description is doctrinally accurate whether the standard technically is good faith, fiduciary duty, or something else entirely--as is the case in some jurisdictions other than the United States when, for example, they focus on avoiding duress. [FN13] Thus, efforts to reduce the duty in the United States by speaking about good faith instead of fiduciary duty may have no practical effect; all that matters is relative power and conflict. [FN14] Titles are less important than reality. Thus, if there is a titular managing partner, but another partner has all the facts regarding a particular transaction, functionally the latter partner's duty rises. By taking into account the transactor's power and conflict, the person owing lower standards in most contexts can actually owe a higher standard in other contexts. This nuanced approach prevents the standards from providing so much protection to the usually vulnerable party that this party acquires excessive power in the particular circumstance. Thus, the standards level the playing field, but they do not overcorrect and tilt the field in favor of the formerly weak. This flexible standard of performance serves to level the playing field. The standard puts the parties in a position that allows them to bargain meaningfully. It is as though the downstream landowner, by regulation, were awarded the right to be free from pollution. Because the landowner then has an asset (the right) to sell, there is a basis from which the landowner can bargain with the polluter. In this same way, because the flexible standard grants the nonmanaging partner the right to have the managing partner not abuse its power despite the latter's conflict, the managing partner must engage the other partners. For example, if the managing partner requests permission to compete with the partnership in a particular transaction, the other partners know that they have no obligation to accede to the request, and that the managing partner is under a duty to disclose all information relevant to the negotiation. In this way, the flexible standard allows the parties to form, in accordance with their true preferences, a contract or even a business organization.
B. Limited Liability in the Mix
Limited liability, when combined with a reduction of standards of performance, substantially eliminates accountability. The practical consequences are significant because the expansion of limited liability is one of the major changes suggested for unincorporated businesses. Over the past ten years, partnerships in the United States have *1006 acquired the option of limited liability, [FN15] and various new limited-liability forms have evolved. [FN16] Thus, limited liability is an inevitable backdrop against which to consider standards of performance; in turn, as seen above, standards of performance make bargaining possible. [FN17] This expansion of limited liability has not only taken the United States by storm, but is also gaining credibility in the United Kingdom, as evidenced by the Limited Liability Partnership statute adopted in 2000. [FN18] What is the impact of this burgeoning limited liability on standards of performance? The limited liability of all owners in unincorporated businesses should not perceptibly affect the level of the standards of performance applicable to those owners. This is *1007 counterintuitive: Limited liability appears principally to reduce the risk of being a partner, [FN19] and thus to reduce the damage that a managing partner can inflict on fellow partners. To this extent, it apparently diminishes the managing partner's power, although not necessarily the conflict of interest. Since it appears to reduce power, limitation of liability seems consistent with reduction of the standard of performance owed by a managing partner to fellow partners. Consider an analogy to corporations formed in the United States and, to a lesser degree, in the United Kingdom. [FN20] Although this Article discusses only the responsibility of managers who are owners, consider specifically the director of a corporation. In very broad outline, whether or not the director is also a shareholder, the business judgment rule protects that director from liability, absent gross negligence or some form of disloyal behavior. In other words, the United States business form that for the past century has provided owners with limited liability also gives the managers wide latitude. Nevertheless, the better result--at least for firms that are not publicly held--is to hold an ownermanager to the same high standard of performance whether or not the business limits the liability of owners. [FN21] We already recognize that a person who is both a manager and an owner should be held to a higher--not lower--standard than a non-manager owner because of the manager's extra power. Although the fact that all owners are protected by the limited liability provisions does appear to reduce the owner-manager's potential impact, consider the effect on that owner-manager directly. An owner that manages one of the new limited-liability business forms still has the full *1008 management authority of a managing partner. Due to the limitation on liability, however, the owner-manager is far less accountable than is the traditional managing partner. First, the owner-manager becomes unaccountable to third parties, beyond any initial investment in the firm. Second, unless subject to a sufficiently high standard of performance, the owner-manager will be unaccountable to fellow-owners as well. With respect to this balance of power, the owner-manager's unaccountability offsets the manager's decreased impact on coowners who benefit from limited liability. On the other hand, the standard imposed on the owner-manager should be higher than that applicable to a director who is not a shareholder, because of the inherent conflict in being both an owner and a manager. It makes sense that the schema requires increased responsibility when the manager is also an owner, even in a limited liability entity. Frequently, more passive investors do demand that managers become owners in order to align the managers' interests with those of the non-manager owners. Nevertheless, a higher standard of performance remains appropriate because the combination of management power and ownership still creates a conflict. In any event, aligning the managers' interests with the investors' interests merely increases the probability that the managers act as the non-manager owners would have done. It does not eliminate all situations where the managers have access to an opportunity that, because of their power, they can appropriate. In such a case, these managers can do serious damage even if the other owners are not subject to personal liability. Doctrinally, standards of performance are flexible, and their flexibility levels the playing field. The standards are effective because their flexibility depends on the transactor's power and conflict. That flexibility even takes into account the owners' limited liability in the modern forms of business organization. On the other hand, the principal threat to the standards' effectiveness is that the salutary flexibility eases into vagueness. As discussed in the following section, these flexible standards do remain effective because they are bracketed by boundaries that protect their precision.
III. The Standards of Performance Are Precise and Predictable
To ascertain how precise the standards are, consider both the floor and the ceiling.
A. The Floor The principal criticism of standards of performance has focused on the distortions that result when parties are forbidden from entering into a transaction that they both agreed to freely. In other words, if at least one of the parties is prevented from behaving to a standard as low as that to which the parties agreed, this, according to the neoclassical economists, entails a waste of resources. [FN22] As the previous discussion of the downstream landowner illustrates, however, the argument fails if the parties were in fact unable to bargain freely, because the resulting agreement does not reflect preferences. The weaker party would have lost the shelter of the standards through the appearance of agreement, but without having truly bargained. Indeed, the standards will not be able to level the *1009 playing field unless they can force the parties to conform to a higher standard than that to which they appear to have agreed. On the other hand, the standards' commendable flexibility may trigger an unintended consequence. Instead of leveling the field, the standards may well tilt it if their contours are so vague as to be unknowable. In this case, prudent parties may be driven by the standards' imprecision to adopt a standard higher than whatever is mandated. This concern about excessively high performance touches on the rule-versus-standard debate articulated brilliantly by Duncan Kennedy twenty-five years ago. [FN23] It also touches on the distinction between risk, which is measurable, and uncertainty, which is not. [FN24] In a way, we are again talking about a by-product of the standards' flexibility, but I will show that the by-product is risk and thus is calculable within a range. Note that the concept of the floor itself is not in controversy; even the fiercest critics of standards of performance accept some type of floor. Bad faith and opportunism, for example, are universally condemned because they produce inefficient results. [FN25] Further, this floor is supported by parties' behavior even without legal intervention. At least where the reputational effects are sufficient, business people do act according to a standard even higher than required by law. [FN26] The actual floor therefore is a behavioral norm, [FN27] reenforced by the law's articulation of the flexible good faith and fiduciary standards. Given that there is a floor defined by behavior, it is sensible to use statutory and judicial pronouncements to support the floor. The potential abuse that falls through the floor is an abuse of power, and a powerful transactor who has a conflict of interest may not be restrained by purely extralegal means. The good faith and fiduciary standards discussed above provide a flexible support; the problem is what happens above the floor.
B. The Ceiling
To assert there is a ceiling above this floor is more controversial. Together with the floor, the ceiling allows the flexible standards of performance to escape vagueness. Not only are the standards defined and limited by power and conflict, and not only are they limited by a floor, but the ceiling, too, increases predictability. The flexibility of the *1010 minimum performance requirement may be frustrating, of course, but the frustration is attenuated if the transactor knows the maximum required performance. Those who reject standards of performance most strenuously, asserting that they create distortions, are in fact concerned about a lack of ceiling. [FN28] What is the highest level of performance that the law demands in a particular circumstance? Put differently, where is the safe harbor? If the opponents of standards believe that the sky is the limit, that there is no meaningful ceiling, they are reasonable when they fear an inefficient result. They are reasonable when they fear that, despite the standards' nuanced flexibility, the standards may ultimately tilt the field in favor of the formerly vulnerable party. However, classic doctrine confirms that there is a ceiling, and one that protects both parties while merely leveling the field. For example, while a partner traditionally has an obligation to the co-partners, the partner is nevertheless expected to seek profits and, unlike a trustee, does not have to sacrifice for other partners. [FN29] This provides a safe harbor. The ceiling is further described by two games taken from a study by behavioral economists Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin. [FN30] 1. Behavior Describes an Observable Ceiling In general terms, each game consists of two parts. First, one player in a group has a choice to take a prize or to enter the game. For ease of discussion, I will call each of the first players "Albert," although the study does not discuss gender. If an Albert chooses to enter the game, he does so by giving the other player, whom I will call "Barbara," a pre-ordained choice. In the first game (Game One), Albert can take the entire prize, at which point Barbara receives nothing. Astonishingly, seventeen percent of the Alberts act to all appearances hyper-generously and forgo the sure prize. The next surprise is that almost two-thirds of the Barbaras respond to their Albert's generosity in a self-regarding, Pareto sub-optimal way. [FN31] *1011 The Barbaras' grasping response to the Alberts' hyper-generosity is consistent with the traditional game theoretic perspective on the prisoners' dilemma where, in the absence of an infinite time-horizon, initial cooperation may well trigger defection. [FN32] Clearly, this game does not reflect reciprocity since almost two-thirds of the Barbaras repaid their Albert's generosity by the meanest kind of greed. [FN33] However, the other game (Game Two) does suggest that the impetus behind the Barbaras' grasping behavior in Game One is something more than a mere failure to cooperate. The result in Game Two cannot be explained by simply asserting that people in the second half of any game tend to be grasping because Game Two's outcome is very different. In Game Two, [FN34] Albert's original choice is either to give Barbara the entire prize and keep nothing, or to enter the game. The rational decision for Albert is to enter the game: if he does not enter, he is sure to receive nothing, but if he does enter, Barbara cannot put him in a worse position than receiving nothing, and she could decide to let him share in the prize. Thus, it is unsurprising that all the Alberts decide to enter the game. [FN35] What is surprising is the Barbaras' response in Game Two: when confronted with an Albert who acts rationally but not particularly generously, more than half the Barbaras respond in the most generous way by giving up the right to receive the entire prize in order to share it with this rational Albert. In summary, in Game One, when an Albert has acted hyper-generously and forgoes a sure prize, almost two-thirds of the Barbaras respond in a self-regarding, Pareto sub-optimal way. In Game Two, when an Albert has acted rationally but not particularly generously, over half of the Barbaras respond very generously. Thus, the Barbaras' grasping response to the Alberts' hypergenerosity in Game One cannot be explained by arguing that people in the second half of any game will tend to be grasping; clearly that did not happen in Game Two. *1012 The authors of the study express puzzlement at the result of Game Two, [FN36] but I offer the following explanation that reconciles the seeming inconsistencies between Games One and Two. In many cases, the irrational negotiator succeeds beyond normal expectations because the inherent unpredictability of irrational positions renders that negotiator a particularly formidable and dangerous opponent. [FN37] The Barbaras in Game One are confronted with an irrational (albeit hyper-generous) Albert whose irrational behavior makes him dangerous. Why is he hyper-generous? What will he do next? A majority of the Barbaras respond in a self-protective way. In contrast, the Barbaras in Game Two are confronted with an Albert who is neither particularly generous nor ungenerous, but who is rational and, therefore, predictable. In that context, the Barbaras are less self-regarding. These games help us think about predictability. They help us analyze the difference between uncertainty, which is unmeasurable, and risk, which is measurable and thus quantifiable. Irrational Albert of Game One represents uncertainty even though he is acting generously; a majority of the Barbaras punish him. Earlier, I noted that the Barbaras, faced with an irrational negotiator, would ask themselves why seventeen percent of the Alberts choose to be hypergenerous; precisely because of this uncertainty, there is no answer to that question. In contrast, Albert in Game Two represents risk, which is predictable and thus quantifiable, and a majority of the Barbaras reward him by sharing the prize. In short, Albert's hyper-generous behavior in Game One is higher than any applicable standard of performance, and he has pierced the ceiling. The Barbaras provide the extralegal constraint: If Albert behaves too well he will be punished rather than rewarded because parties seek certainty. Therefore, the standard of performance is self-limiting because, if Albert behaves too well, Barbara's reaction eliminates his incentive to over-perform again. This ceiling simultaneously provides other Alberts with a safe harbor because an Albert who behaves as selflessly as the hyper-generous seventeen percent who entered Game One can be confident that, far from violating a duty to Barbara, he has exceeded every obligation. To summarize, a majority of Barbaras punish an Albert's irrationally generous behavior; they reward an Albert's rational, predictable behavior. Albert in Game One engages in behavior that is too generous, and almost two-thirds of the Barbaras effect a Pareto sub-optimal split that deprives society of value. Importantly, these Barbaras punish each Albert by leaving him with the least possible amount, and thus deprive *1013 Albert of far more than the Barbaras' individual gain. [FN38] The Barbaras' behavior has defined the Alberts' ceiling.
The Ceiling, Applied
The challenge is to ascertain how, as a practical matter, the ceiling manifests itself and, together with the floor, describes a standard of performance sufficiently precise to satisfy practical expectations. In short: how do Game One and Albert's hyper-generosity manifest themselves in the context of contracts and unincorporated businesses? [FN39] In the context of arm's-length contracts without special circumstances such as percentage leases, the floor is the familiar absence of opportunism and absence of bad faith, to use two formulations. Moving to the top of the standard of performance: the ceiling is behavior so aberrant that, to use the objective perspective, a reasonable person in Barbara's position would wonder whether Albert is dangerous. Barbara has no legal basis on which to sue Albert for Albert's generosity, of course, since Albert's hyper-generous behavior certainly is not illegal. Instead, it is the relationship itself that will control Albert, because his generosity is not reciprocated. Thus, there is a socially constructed, extralegal constraint on excessively generous behavior. Essentially the same result occurs if, for example, Albert is a partner. If Albert as a partner behaves with unexpected selflessness, that behavior will be contained because the other partners will view it as dangerous and will not reciprocate. We know that a partner traditionally has a duty to benefit the firm, subject to the partner's expectation of profits from the partnership. Imagine a partnership in which Albert has a valuable asset that he is considering contributing to the firm. He also believes that his partner, Barbara, tends to shirk. Thus, he believes that any increase in value of the partnership will in unprovable ways disproportionately benefit Barbara, even if his ownership share increases to reflect his contribution. Barbara's shirking, if proved, would be a violation of her duty to the partnership, and Albert is under no duty to contribute a new asset. What should Albert do? The doctrine-based recommendation to Albert would in all likelihood be that he should retain the asset. Based on the analysis outlined in this Article, the result would be the same. However, if he were in a group like the seventeen percent of hyper-generous Alberts in Game One, he would contribute the asset to the partnership in the hope that Barbara would work harder and that both partners could benefit proportionately through the firm. In response, most of the Barbaras would continue to shirk subtly and would derive a disproportionate benefit from the new asset. While Albert has not violated a duty by contributing the asset, his generosity will not be rewarded or otherwise supported, except in the unlikely event that his Barbara's shirking is proved. Thus, unexpectedly *1014 generous behavior is self-limiting. This is how we know that there is a ceiling, and that the ceiling is defined and enforced by extralegal means. The definition of the ceiling as well as the floor thus is socially constructed; the corollary is that it can be socially destroyed. That definition will be less vulnerable if law encourages it. Thus, it is important to know the extent to which law supports this extralegal ceiling created by behavior. We already know that there exists a minimum commercial behavior [FN40] and that the law supports the standard of performance's floor by focusing on potentially abusive behavior. The law tells the party to the contract not to be opportunistic, and it tells the inevitably conflicted partner of the partnership not to abuse the position of power. In contrast, the law does not directly address the ceiling: it does not tell the party to the contract or the partner (Albert in our examples) not to be too generous. However, it does tell Barbara, once she acquires the choice and thus the power and conflict, not to be abusive, as abuse is defined within the relevant context. She has to take into account how able Albert is to bargain freely, including how diversified Albert is, for example. [FN41] If Barbara's response falls through the floor of the standard of performance the law offers Albert protection against abuse. If Game One's Albert gives up the prize because, for example, Barbara fraudulently misrepresented facts, Barbara's behavior is abusive. Not only is Albert's behavior not censured, but he will be protected, at least indirectly, because Barbara's behavior will be punished. On the other hand, if a compos mentis but hugely generous Albert turns over the full prize to Barbara, Albert has pushed through the ceiling of required behavior and will not normally be protected. Assume, for example, that Albert is a partner and the partnership agreement requires the first distributions of partnership assets to be those stipulated in Game One. Under these circumstances, Albert should be able to keep the full prize; that was the behavior of eighty-three percent of the Alberts. [FN42] However, when seventeen percent of Alberts hyper-generously enter the game, and Barbara has a choice, she becomes the person with power, acting pursuant to a contract that was entered into properly. Under these facts, when she seizes that choice, Barbara has some potential for liability, depending on the reason why those seventeen percent of Alberts behaved hyper-generously. She is especially at risk if there is a significant question about Albert's competence. Here, the flexibility of the standard applies to Barbara, because Barbara owes a duty to Albert. On the other hand, if Barbara has no liability, she keeps the prize because Albert was hyper-generous, and the law supports the extralegal ceiling on Albert's behavior. If Barbara does have liability, Albert was in all probability more gullible than hyper-generous.
We can see what has happened: the players describe the maximum standard of performance that, like the floor, varies by context, including the transactor's power. The law, by contrast, does not directly determine what behavior is the maximum demanded of a transactor. Instead, the law stipulates when the other party's response is abusive. If, for *1015 example, Albert's behavior is generous beyond what is required by law, Game One reveals that this behavior may encourage Barbara to grab the maximum benefit even at Albert's expense. The fact that Barbara reacts in a brutally selfish manner without liability is an indication within the context provided by law that Albert exceeded the maximum required standard. [FN43] Thus the law does indirectly confirm that Albert exceeded the maximum standard of behavior, and it thus does support extralegal constraints on hyper-generosity, such as those reflected in Game One. In this way, the law supports the extralegal efforts to rein in uncertainty.
IV. Standards of Performance Must Be Mandatory, or They Unravel Understanding that the standards of performance are flexible and precise, should standards of performance be mandatory, or should these standards instead be waivable? In the United States there has been a significant push, partly by statute and partly by judicial decision, to conclude that even default standards are waivable. [FN44] This is an unfortunate development. The problem with waivers is that it is precisely when a party is asked to waive protection that the party may be unable to bargain freely. It is deeply ironic that courts are invited to apply the lowest contract-law standard of performance when reviewing a waiver of the highest standard applied to operations. Instead, if the parties purport to agree that neither shall owe heightened duties to the other, that agreement at minimum should be subject to scrutiny on the same level as the duties to be waived. Otherwise, the standard unravels to the lowest applicable level. For example, assume that all partners execute a partnership agreement that allows each to compete freely with the partnership. Even though the agreement itself is a contract, remember that partnership formation, of which the contract is merely an element, is consensual rather than contractual. [FN45] The agreement thus should be scrutinized as of the time of formation, even though doctrine otherwise rarely admits that even good faith applies to contract formation. The relevant questions are: At the time when the agreement was entered into, were all parties in a position to negotiate freely? *1016 And what were the parties' reasonable expectations concerning how a particular provision would be interpreted? Furthermore, it is important to scrutinize the standards closely, taking into account the context, because the standards are bigger than any one aspect of contract or unincorporated business law. The underlying, interrelated concepts are that behavioral norms provide us a practical definition of Albert's floor and ceiling, within which the standards' flexibility works its corrective effects. These concepts specify, for example, that the ceiling is located where Albert's action creates uncertainty, and that this extralegal ceiling on Albert's behavior is supported by the standard of performance the law imposes on Barbara. Unless destroyed by statute, the concepts apply to all relationships within the business organization, not only to operations (already a huge arena). For instance, the concepts apply even to dissolution. Dissolution is a means of exit, and the question of whether a party should be able to exit under specific circumstances is essentially a question of who is behaving abusively--the person seeking the exit, or the person seeking to retain control of the business? [FN46] The standards have a abroad impact on business relationships and permeate our commercial lives. As we learn how norms are formed and supported, we have to consider that we permit unbargained-for abuse when we start from the assumption that all parties are already on a level playing field and that the markets therefore are the proper arbiters of all disputes. Since norms are central to this analysis, we must remember that there is also a feedback effect on society at large. Thus, the norms we embrace in our commercial lives affect those of the greater society. [FN47] *1017 V. Conclusion If the law speaks only in terms of bargains and markets, and assumes, contrafactually, a level playing field, it may well limit effective bargaining. The standards of performance are designed to rectify a pre-existing inequality and to correct the playing field's tilt. They do so by introducing the flexible standard that rises in direct proportion to the transactor's power and conflict of interest. These standards are predictable as well as nuanced. They are subject to both a floor and a ceiling: a floor defined by commercial realities which the law supports directly, and a ceiling (within a range defined by commercial behavior) which the law supports indirectly. Our efforts in the United States to reduce or even eliminate heightened standards of performance are wrong-headed and should be rejected. Certainly, they should not be exported. Standards of performance that are flexible, but cabined, make efficient bargains possible. 
